![]() ![]() The Court did dismiss the statutory claims and attorney fees, because there was not evidence that the insured had assigned the claims to Trinity and without evidence of an assignment, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter this portion of the judgment.Ĭase updates are intended to inform our clients and others about legal matters of current interest. Without such a motion, Ohio’s arguments were time barred. It was Ohio’s responsibility to file a motion to vacate judgment within one year of the default order. Even though Trinity waited over a year to collect the judgment, in order to gain a procedural advantage, doing so was not unfair or deceptive. The Court rejected Ohio’s argument that, because Trinity purposefully delayed executing on the judgment, the motion should be vacated. A CR 60(b) motion must be brought within one year after the default order or judgment is entered. Under that rule, a defendant moving to vacate a judgment must prove four factors: (1) its failure to appear was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect (2) there is substantial evidence supporting a prima facie defense (3) it acted with due diligence after notice of the default judgment and (4) vacating the default judgment would not cause the plaintiff substantial hardship. On review, the Court of Appeal looked to CR 60(b)(1), Washington’s rule on vacating default judgment. That motion was denied, and Ohio appealed. After learning of the judgment, Ohio moved to vacate the judgment on numerous grounds, essentially arguing that because it was not properly served, its failure to appear was inadvertent. Trinity strategically waited 1 year and 5 days to attempt to collect on the judgment. The total judgment was $764,271, which included trebled damages, defense costs, and attorney fees. Ohio failed to appear or file an answer and Trinity was awarded a default judgment. Trinity then sued Ohio for subrogation, equitable contribution, insurer bad faith, and statutory claims under the Consumer Protection Act and Insurance Fair Conduct Act. Trinity continued to defend Millennium, eventually settling with Riley for $225,000. Trinity accepted tender in January 2009, then attempted to tender the defense back to Ohio, in August 2009. Ohio then tendered the defense to Trinity, claiming that Millennium was an additional insured under the policy Trinity issued to Cascade. Millennium tendered defense of the lawsuit to its insurer, Ohio Casualty Insurance (“Ohio”). Riley sued the project’s general contractor, Millennium Building (“Millennium”). ![]() Cascade was insured by Trinity Universal Insurance (“Trinity”). ![]() At the time, Riley was employed by Cascade Construction (“Cascade”), a subcontractor on the project. Philip Riley (“Riley”) was injured while working on a construction project. in the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division I, No. Washington courts are willing to vacate default judgments, but only in limited circumstances, the facts of which can be difficult to establish, on the part of the party moving to vacate. Failing to properly appear may expose a defendant to a default judgment and vacating that judgment can be very difficult. Washington Case Udpate: Failure to Vacate Default Judgment Within One Year Not Excused by Strategic Delay in Judgment Collectionįrom the Desk of Kyle Riley: In this case, the Washington Court of Appeals held that a prevailing party’s intentional delay in collecting on a default judgment or order is not an unfair or deceptive act that waives the one year deadline to vacate a default judgment.Ĭlaims Pointer: Insurers should respond promptly to civil complaints. ![]()
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